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Presenting information in a coherent fashion has been shown to increase processing 
fluency, which in turn influences affective responses. The pattern of responses have 
been explained by two apparently competing accounts: hedonic marking (response to 
fluency is positive) and fluency amplification (response to fluency can be positive or 
negative, depending on stimuli valence). This paper proposes that these accounts are 
not competing explanations, but separate mechanisms, serving different purposes. 
Therefore, their individual contributions to overall affective responses should be 
observable. In three experiments, participants were presented with businesses 
scenarios, with riskiness (valence) and coherence (fluency) manipulated, and affective 
responses recorded. Results suggested that increasing the fluency of stimuli increases 
positive affect. If the stimulus is negative, then increasing fluency simultaneously 
increases negative affect. These affective responses appeared to cancel each other out 
(Experiment 1) when measured using self-report bipolar scales. However, separate 
measurement of positive and negative affect, either using unipolar scales (Experiment 
2) or using facial electromyography (Experiment 3), provided evidence for co-
occurring positive and negative affective responses, and therefore the co-existence of 
hedonic marking and fluency amplification mechanisms.  
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The experience of encountering coherent information will be common to most people: a 
researcher receiving new data for their existing dataset, a doctor discovering a new symptom in a 
patient that they are treating, a detective uncovering a new clue to collate with their current 
evidence. Even without analysis of the new information, the above subjects experience a feeling of 
whether it fits coherently with the existing pattern, if it is inconsistent (Sweklej, Balas, Pochwatko, 
& Godlewska, 2014), or if a discrepancy has occurred (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). Such 
feelings, vibes (Epstein, 1994), or hunches (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c) can be accurate, with 
evidence showing that participants can distinguish coherent word triads, those that share a common 
semantic associate, from incoherent triads (Bauman & Kuhl, 2002; Bolte, Goschke & Kuhl, 2003; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2008), even when under time pressure (Bolte & Goschke, 2005), and without 
requiring actual common associate retrieval. These responses to coherent information have also 
been recorded in the form of affective responses, whereby coherent word triads are liked more than 
incoherent triads (Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009a). 
The accuracy of intuitive coherence detection is thought to arise from the increased processing 
fluency of coherent information compared to incoherent information. In remote associate tests 
(RAT; Mednick, 1962) and similar word triad designs (e.g. Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers, 
Regeher, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990), coherent word triads (e.g. SALT DEEP FOAM) are those 
that share a common semantic associate (e.g. SEA). It is thought that when an individual reads the 
final word in a coherent triad, it is already partially activated by the common associate, and 
therefore its processing is facilitated. This results in coherent word triads being processed faster 
than incoherent triads (Topolinski & Strack, 2009b). 
Increased processing fluency has been shown to influence a wide range of judgements, such as 
truth (Reber & Schwarz, 1999), familiarity (Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990), confidence 
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(Kelley & Lindsay, 1993), and many others (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 for a review). 
However, affective responses are potentially the most important. This is because evidence has 
suggested that affect can act as a cue for other judgements (Topolinski, 2011). Yet there is some 
debate over the patterns of affective responses to increased processing fluency. It has been argued 
that an increase in processing fluency is always met with a positive response (hedonic marking; 
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). On the other hand, affective responses to 
increasing processing fluency could be dependent on the valence of stimuli used (fluency 
amplification; Albrecht & Carbon, 2014). Whilst these accounts have been presented as competing 
or alternative explanations, this paper proposes that hedonic marking and fluency amplification are 
different mechanisms, and serve different purposes. Furthermore, affective responses to increased 
fluency may be best explained by the co-existence and combined contribution of these two 
mechanisms.  
Hedonic marking of processing fluency 
Hedonic marking has perhaps been the dominant explanation of the direct effects of fluency 
(Claypool, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2015), suggesting that fluent processing of information is 
fundamentally positive (Winkielman et al., 2003). As such, increasing fluency enhances positive 
affective responses (Topolinski et al., 2009; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). Support for 
this prediction has been gathered from a diverse range of fluency manipulations, including 
perceptual, conceptual, linguistic, and embodied cognition (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
Compelling evidence has also been gained using facial electromyography (fEMG).  This method 
has demonstrated higher levels of activity in the zygomaticus major muscle – indicating positive 
affect (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986) – for fluent stimuli compared to non-fluent stimuli. 
Such increased activity has been found reliably, using perceptual manipulations such as contour 
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priming and stimuli duration (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), and familiarisation (Harmon-Jones 
& Allen, 2001), as well as using conceptual manipulations such as semantic coherence (Topolinski 
et al., 2009). The use of fEMG as method of measure affect reduces unintentional cueing that may 
arise from self-report scales, and therefore further supports a direct link between fluency and 
positive affect.  
Fluency Amplification 
Despite extensive support for the hedonic marking of processing fluency, it has been observed 
that these experiments tend to use stimuli of a neutral valence. In response, Albrecht and Carbon 
(2014) varied the valence of their stimuli in addition to manipulating fluency (using contour 
priming). Results indicated that, consistent with hedonic marking, positive stimuli were liked more 
in the high processing fluency condition. However, for “very negative” stimuli, stimuli were 
disliked more in the high processing fluency condition. This evidence suggests that processing 
fluency emphasises affective responses, leading to “more intense” evaluations rather than strictly 
positive evaluations. Whilst there is less research into this relationship compared to using neutral 
or positive stimuli, support can be found from a retrospective survey of the literature. For example, 
from mere exposure (Zajonc, 1968) studies, negatively valenced words were judged to be 
significantly more negative on repeated exposure (Grush, 1976), and increasing the number of 
exposures of initially disliked paintings resulted in a decrease in affective rating (Brickman, 
Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972). Although not classified as such at the time, these findings 
support fluency amplification. The same pattern has also been found in marketing research, where 
increasing the retrieval ease of a target product can lead to increased negative evaluations when 
primed by a conceptually related, but negative product (Lee & Labroo, 2004).  
Multi-source account 
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Hedonic marking and fluency amplification make different predictions for the affective response 
to increasing the processing fluency of negatively valenced stimuli. Hedonic marking predicts that 
such an increase in fluency would be met with a positive affective response, regardless of the 
stimuli’s valence. In contrast, fluency amplification predicts a negative affective response due to 
the amplification of the stimuli’s negative valence. These two accounts have therefore been offered 
as competing or alternative explanations for affective responses to fluency (Cheetham, Suter, & 
Jancke, 2014; Chetverikov & Kristjánsson, 2016; Gerger, Forster, & Leder, 2016; Muth, 
Hesslinger, & Carbon, 2015).  
However, we propose that hedonic marking and fluency amplification are separable 
mechanisms that serve different functions. The hedonic marking mechanism indicates that 
information has been processed fluently, with the reaction being positive for a number of possible 
reasons: a signal for progress “toward cognitive goals” (Claypool et al., 2015), for familiarity and 
safety (Winkielman et al., 2003), or for the use of non-analytic thinking (Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley, & Eyre, 2007). The purpose of a fluency amplification response has not been investigated 
as comprehensively. However, a mechanism of emphasising a stimulus’ valence appears useful for 
indicating unambiguity (Albrecht, Raab, & Carbon, 2014), for making choices without deliberation 
(Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007), or forming more definitive opinions, particularly 
in a social context (Haddock, 2002; Tormala, Falces, Briñol, & Petty, 2007). A similar pattern 
occurs in affective forecasting due to impact bias (e.g. Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), where similar 
polarisation may help motivate us to seek out good scenarios, whilst motivating us to avoid bad 
ones. Given their separate utility, co-existence is appropriate, in a similar vein as to having a 
number of heuristics in our adaptive toolboxes (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 
1999). Therefore, rather than competing explanations for affective responses to fluency, we suggest 
AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO COHERENCE 
7 
 
that hedonic marking and fluency amplification co-exist, with both mechanisms contributing to the 
overall response. 
This multi-source account for affective responses to fluency makes an interesting prediction for 
circumstances where fluency is increased for negative stimuli. In such cases, increased processing 
fluency would result in an increase in positive affect (via hedonic marking) and an increase in 
negative affect (via fluency amplification). The presence of both positive and negative affect is 
consistent with the conceptualisation that positive and negative affective responses are separable 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), and can operate independently 
(Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 2008); as well as the notion that fluency can produce “competing forces” 
(Oppenheimer, 2008) which may interact or cancel each other out. However, co-existence has not 
been detected in previous studies. This would require the manipulation of stimulus valence, as well 
as separate measurement of positive and negative affect. To the authors’ knowledge, such a design 
has yet to be implemented.  
For example, in Winkielman & Cacioppo’s (2001) paper supporting hedonic marking, positive 
and negative affect were measured separately, with fEMG used to record zygomaticus major and 
corrugator supercilii (associated with negative affect) muscle activity. However, the stimuli used 
in the study were drawings of neutral objects, meaning the affective response to negative stimuli 
would not have been examined. Additionally, a fluency amplification mechanism would not 
contribute any affective response when the stimuli are neutral. As neutral valence cannot be 
amplified in a positive or negative direction, only the contributions from hedonic marking would 
be measurable. 
On the other hand, Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) study supporting fluency amplification 
measured affective responses over a range of stimuli valence, from very negative to very positive. 
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However, as responses were recorded using a bipolar self-report scale, it meant that positive and 
negative affect were not measured separately. Furthermore, as the affective response from hedonic 
marking is only brief, subtle (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c), and mild (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 
2001), any contribution from this mechanism may have been eclipsed in the more intensely 
positive and negative conditions, to the point of being separately undetectable.  
The present research 
The current research tested for the co-existence of hedonic marking and fluency amplification, 
and their respective contributions to affective responses to fluency. Affective responses were 
measured using self-report (Experiments 1 & 2) and fEMG (Experiment 3), and fluency was 
manipulated for stimuli of positive and negative valence. However, rather than using overtly 
positive or negative stimuli, participants were presented with business scenarios. The valence of 
the scenario was determined by their riskiness, with risks being associated with negative affect, 
and benefits being associated with positive affect (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). The link between risk and valence was tested for 
and confirmed in the pre-study detailed in this paper. Meanwhile, processing fluency was 
manipulated conceptually: fluent scenarios were those that were consistent with a typical schema 
for the given business, whilst non-fluent scenarios contained an item of information that, whilst 
relevant to the business, would not be considered as typical.  
The decision to use business scenarios was made, firstly to increase ecological validity, as 
business scenarios have greater similarity to the tasks people may come across in day to day life. 
Ecological stimuli, and conceptual fluency manipulations in general, are under-represented in the 
literature despite their utility, and this study addresses the gap. Secondly, the use of a more covert 
manipulation for valence was important considering fluency effects have been shown to be most 
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notable when the source is unknown (e.g. Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). 
Regardless of whether the business scenarios are high risk (negative) or low risk (positive), the 
hedonic marking hypothesis predicts that business scenarios that are easier to process (those that 
are made up of typical items) would receive increased positive affective responses. In contrast, 
fluency amplification would predict that the affective response is dependent on the condition’s 
valence. Therefore, easier to process scenarios in the high risk condition would lead to an increase 
in negative affect. However, under the multi-source account, we expect hedonic marking and 
fluency amplification to be separate mechanisms which will make individual contributions to 
affective responses. Therefore, it is expected that easier to process scenarios in the high risk 
condition will result in an increase in both positive and negative affect. The positive affect is 
evoked due to the positive marking of processing fluency, whereas the negative affect is generated 
as an amplification of the stimuli valence. See Table 1 for a summary of the predictions of these 
accounts. 
Evidence for this dual affective response will first be sought from self-report ratings (bipolar in 
Experiment 1; unipolar in Experiment 2). This will then be examined using fEMG (Experiment 3), 
whereby separate measurement of zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscles will allow 
for the separate detection of increases in positive and negative affect.  
Pre-study 
Research has shown that there is an association between risk and valence (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). For example, presenting 
participants with benefits about a technology (such as nuclear power, water fluoridation, chemical 
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plants; Finucane et al., 2000) may lead to a positive affective response, whereas presenting 
participants with risks may lead to a negative affective response.  
Therefore, in the current study, we constructed positive and negative conditions by 
manipulating riskiness. In positive conditions, participants were presented with business scenarios 
made up of benefits, whereas in negative conditions, the scenarios were made up of risks. 
However, it is possible that people would not have strong emotional opinions about business 
scenarios (such as clothing retail, coffee shops, and leisure centres) compared to the stimuli used 
by Finucane et al. (2000), which included items such as cigarettes, pesticides, and alcoholic 
beverages. Furthermore, a straightforward association between risk and affect cannot be taken for 
granted, as the type of risk being assessed (Song & Schwarz, 2009) as well as the type of stimuli 
(Bahník, & Vranka, 2017) may have an influence. Therefore, the pre-study aimed to validate the 
use of our business scenarios. If the association between risk and valence generalises to this 
domain, we expect that business scenarios constructed of benefits would be liked significantly 
more than business scenarios constructed of risks.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty (fourteen female) students were recruited, the majority of whom were 
postgraduates (27 postgraduate students). The results from one participant were discarded due to 
the length of time they spent completing the task (z-score > 3.29), resulting in a final sample of 
twenty-nine (thirteen female) students (26 postgraduates) with a mean age of 26.30 years old (SE 
± 1.10 years). Compensation was provided in the form of a cash prize draw. 
Materials. The stimuli used in the study were business scenarios. Each scenario consisted of a 
short description of the business for background information, followed by three items of 
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information relevant to the business. The items of information were obtained from Datamonitor 
and Mintel industry reports. There were nine business types, and for each type, two scenarios were 
created. The first was a high risk scenario, whereby all of the items of information were risks that 
the business faces. The second was a low risk scenario, whereby all of the items were strengths of 
the business. There were therefore 18 scenarios (nine High risk and nine Low risk), which were 
each presented only once. The scenarios, including the items of information, remained unchanged 
for each participant. The only difference was the randomisation of the order in which the scenarios 
were seen. An example of the business scenarios used can be seen in Table 2. 
Two rating scales were used in the experiment: one for measuring liking and one for measuring 
risk. The liking scale was a five-point Self-Assessment Mannequin (SAM) scale for affective 
valence (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The risk rating scale was a 1-7 self-report Likert scale, ranging 
from “extremely low risk” to “extremely high risk”.  
Design. The pre-study followed a repeated measures design, with riskiness of the scenario as 
the independent variable, and self-reported affect as the dependent variable. Self-reported risk 
ratings were also obtained as way of a manipulation check.  
Procedure. Before the task, participants provided informed consent and read a briefing 
document, which informed them that they were to read and rate a series of business scenarios. 
Participants were instructed to work quickly but carefully through the trials, and that we were 
interested in first impressions – participants were not to think too critically or analytically. 
Participants were also told that there were no right or wrong answers to the rating scales. The 
experimental task was run on E-Prime, displayed on a PC monitor. Participants input their 
responses on the computer keyboard. Each trial consisted of the following: participants were first 
shown a sentence explaining what the business is. Having read this, participants proceeded by 
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pressing the Space bar. Participants were then shown three additional items of information relating 
to the business, presented sequentially in the centre of the screen. Participants pressed the Space 
bar once they had read each item of information to proceed. In between each item of information, 
a fixation cross appeared in the centre of the screen for 500ms. Once all three items had been 
presented, participants were shown the SAM scale and asked to rate how much the liked the 
scenario by pressing the corresponding keyboard key to proceed (ranging from 1 to 5). Following 
this, participants were asked to provide a rating for how risky they thought the scenario was using 
the keyboard to enter the appropriate score. See Figure 1 for a timeline presentation of the 
procedure. Participants completed four practice trials, followed by 18 experimental trials. The 
order of the experimental trials was randomised for each participant.  
Results 
Firstly, the participants’ self-report ratings of risk were examined. The High risk scenarios were 
rated as more risky (M = 6.36 out of 7.00) than the Low risk scenarios (M = 3.51, t(28) = 10.751, p 
< .001, dz = 1.996). In addition, the participants gave higher liking ratings to the Low risk scenarios 
(M = 4.01 out of 5.00) compared to the High risk scenarios (M = 2.82, t(28) = 5.765, p < .001, dz = 
1.071). See Figure 2 for self-report judgements of risk and affect.  
Discussion 
The results of the pilot experiment demonstrated firstly that the High risk scenarios were indeed 
felt to be risky by the participants in comparison to the Low risk scenarios. As predicted, 
participants also liked the Low risk scenarios more than the High risk scenarios. This therefore 
supports the theory that there is a link between valence and risk. It also provides assurance that a 
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risk manipulation can be used in the forthcoming experiments in place of more explicit valence 
manipulations. 
Experiment 1 
The pre-study used a simple one-way design, establishing that High risk and Low risk business 
scenarios could be used to manipulate valence. With confidence gained over the use of these 
scenarios, Experiment 1 added a fluency manipulation as a second level (an example of the items 
used can be seen in Table 3), allowing for the observation of affective responses to increased 
processing fluency, in both positive (Low risk) and negative (High risk) conditions. 
Fluency was manipulated using coherence. For Coherent business scenarios, participants were 
shown three items of information that were all relevant and stereotypical to the business. In 
contrast, Incoherent scenarios featured an item that was relevant to the business being discussed, 
but stereotypical to a different type of business. Therefore, Coherent scenarios feature items that 
all converge on a common associate (the business in question), whereas Incoherent scenarios do 
not. In RAT designs, the common associate in coherent conditions facilitates processing by 
partially activating related concepts. This results in improved response times compared to 
incoherent conditions (Topolinski & Strack, 2009b). Similarly, it is expected that Coherent 
scenarios in Experiment 1 will be processed more fluently than Incoherent scenarios. 
As shown in Table 1, the hedonic marking hypothesis states that fluency is positively marked, 
and therefore predicts that increasing processing fluency results in a positive affective response, 
regardless of whether the stimulus is positive or negative. In contrast, fluency amplification 
suggests that affective responses arise from the amplification of the stimulus’ valence. Unlike 
hedonic marking, fluency amplification therefore predicts that when processing fluency is 
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increased for negative stimuli, the affective response is negative. However, the multi-source 
account proposed by this paper proposes that these two accounts should not be treated as 
competing or alternative explanations, as they may be separate, co-existing mechanisms. If this is 
the case, then neither hedonic marking nor fluency amplification in isolation should be able to 
explain the pattern of affective responses to fluency.  
Affective responses will be better understood by considering the combined contribution of both 
processes. In the context of the current experiment, it therefore means that increasing the coherence 
of Low risk (positive valence) business scenarios should be met with a positive affective response, 
as measured using self-report. This pattern is consistent with both hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification (see Table 1). However, when coherence is increased for High risk (negative) 
scenarios, it is expected that positive affect will be evoked due to hedonic marking, alongside an 
increase in negative affect due to the amplification of the valence of the scenario. As affect is 
measured using self-report, it is expected that liking ratings will be made from an interaction of 
the positive and negative affect.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty two (27 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology 
undergraduate course (28 psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab 
token scheme. The mean age was 20.19 years old (SE ± 0.35 years).  
Materials. The Coherent conditions in this experiment were identical to the pre-study, using 
the same nine high risk and nine low scenarios. To construct the Incoherent conditions, the final 
item in a Coherent scenario (e.g. Travel) was replaced with the final item from another Coherent 
scenario (e.g. Leisure). The resulting Incoherent scenarios were created to present three items of 
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information that were relevant to the business, however the final item would be less typically 
associated with that business (see Table 3 for an example). Therefore, four scenarios were created 
for each of the nine business types (Coherent-High risk, Coherent-Low risk, Incoherent-High risk, 
Incoherent-Low risk, see Table 3), totalling 36 business scenarios in this experiment. Participants 
were shown each scenario once, and in a random order. To control for factors such as sentence 
length and difficulty, we made sure that the stimuli were balanced; each triad item appeared once 
in a coherent scenario, and once in an incoherent scenario. The two rating scales, for liking and for 
risk, were the same as used in the pre-study. 
Design. The experiment used a two (Coherent vs Incoherent) by two (High risk vs Low risk) 
repeated measures design, with self-reported affect as the dependent variable. Coherence related 
to whether the scenario fit a typical schema, whilst risk related to whether the scenario was made 
up of risks or strengths. Self-reported risk and the reading time of the final item of the triad were 
recorded as manipulation checks.   
Procedure. The procedure followed that of the pre-study, except for the addition of the 
Incoherent scenarios (detailed above), meaning the participants now viewed 36 scenarios. The time 
it took the participants to read the final item in each triad was also recorded in E-Prime as a measure 
of fluency. Reading time was also used as an indicator for outliers – unexpectedly long reading 
times would indicate more analytic processing, and unexpectedly short reading times would 
indicate guessing, skipping, or mistakes.   
Results 
Response times. A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA 
was run on the reading times for the third items in the risk item triads, revealing a main effect of 
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Coherence (F(1,31) = 18.591, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38), but no main effect of Risk (F(1,31) = .080, p = .779, 
ηp
2 < .01), and no interaction effect (F(1,31) = .763, p = .389, ηp
2 = .02). For the main effect of 
Coherence, paired samples t-tests revealed that the effect resulted from the reading time for the 
final item in the triad being shorter for Coherent triads than Incoherent triads in both the Low risk 
(Coherent M = 2,752ms; Incoherent M = 3,190ms; t(1,31) = 3.568, p = .001, dz = .631) and High risk 
conditions (Coherent M = 2,848ms; Incoherent M = 3,141ms; t(1,31) = 2.558, p = .016, dz = .452). 
This pattern can be seen in Figure 3.  
Liking ratings. A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA 
was run on participants’ liking ratings, revealing a main effect of Risk (F(1,31) = 21.443, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .41), as well as a significant interaction between Risk and Coherence (F(1,31) = 6.568, p = 
.015, ηp
2 = .18), but no main effect of Coherence (F(1,31) = 2.786, p = .105, ηp
2 = .08). This 
interaction occurred due to participants liking Coherent triads (M = 3.83) more than Incoherent 
triads (M = 3.65, t(1,31) = 2.784, p = .009, dz = .492) in the Low risk conditions. However, in the 
High risk conditions there was no significant difference between the liking of Coherent (M = 2.99) 
and Incoherent (M = 2.99, t(1,31) = .003, p = .998, dz  < .001) triads, as shown in Figure 4. Both the 
significant main effect of Risk and the significant t-test on Coherence had observed Power > .80.  
Risk ratings. A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA was 
also run on participants’ risk ratings, revealing only a main effect of Risk (F(1,31) = 292.883, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .90), with the high risk conditions (M = 6.36) being judged as riskier overall than the 
low risk conditions (M = 3.34). There was no main effect of Coherence (F(1,31) = .001, p = .981, 
ηp
2 < .01) or interaction effect (F(1,31) = 2.966, p = .095, ηp
2 = .09).  
Discussion 
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Experiment 1 successfully manipulated processing fluency by varying the coherence of 
business scenarios, as seen in the manipulation check and Figure 2. Results indicated that the final 
item in a triad was read faster when preceded by other items typically associated with the same 
type of business, compared to when the preceding items were more typically associated with a 
different type of business.  
As predicted by both hedonic marking and fluency amplification, liking ratings in the Low risk 
(positive valence) conditions were higher for Coherent triads of information than for Incoherent 
triads of information. However, the liking results from the High risk (negative valence) condition 
cannot be explained by either the hedonic marking hypothesis or the fluency amplification account 
in isolation. Hedonic marking would predict an increase in liking ratings for Coherent triads due 
to the increased processing fluency; fluency amplification would predict a decrease in liking 
ratings for Coherent triads due to the amplification of the negative valence of this condition. 
Instead, no significant difference was found, and it may therefore be that both processes occurred, 
as predicted by a multi-source account (Table 1). This account would therefore predict opposing 
directions of affective response, which negate each other in order to decide upon a single self-
report rating.  
Despite reaching a different conclusion, these results are consistent with Albrecht and Carbon 
(2014). Although their “very negative” condition found that fluent stimuli were liked less than 
non-fluent stimuli, indicating the amplification mechanism, their “mildly negative” condition 
showed no significant difference between fluent and non-fluent stimuli. This could be explained 
by a multi-source account. As positive affect evoked via hedonic marking has been shown to be 
brief, subtle (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c), and mild (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), in “very 
negative” scenarios, this positive affect may have been outweighed by such an extent that it had 
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an inconsequential, undetectable effect on the overall liking rating. In contrast, in the “mildly 
negative” condition, the affective responses from the separate hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification mechanisms would have been of a more similar intensity, and therefore cancelled 
each other out as in the current Experiment 1. 
If it is the case that both positive and negative affect were being generated in the Coherent-High 
risk condition, it should be possible to record them separately. After all, models suggest that 
positive and negative affect do not exist on a simple continuum, but are separate processes 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). The next experiment addressed 
this by using unipolar scales to separately measure positive and negative affect.  
Experiment 2 
An alternative explanation for Experiment 1’s High risk condition, where we did not find a 
significant difference in liking between Coherent and Incoherent triads, would be that fluency did 
not evoke an affective response at all. In Experiment 2, we challenged this alternative explanation 
by measuring positive and negative affect separately with unipolar scales: one for liking, and one 
for disliking. This addresses the aforementioned shortfall in the literature, whilst also gathering 
more evidence using our business scenario paradigm.  
We also wanted to address a second alternative explanation: that the changes in affective 
response were caused by differences in meaning between the Coherent and Incoherent scenarios, 
rather than processing fluency. To do this, a new scenario type was introduced: Early Incoherent. 
The Early Incoherent scenarios contained exactly the same items and information as the Incoherent 
scenarios, but the item order was altered. Whilst Incoherent scenarios ended with the incoherent 
item, the Early Incoherent scenarios presented the incoherent item first. Early Incoherent items 
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therefore finish with stereotypical items, and should feel more fluent as a result. If meaning caused 
the difference in affective responses, then we would expect the Incoherent and Early Incoherent 
scenarios to be judged the same in terms of positive and negative affect. However, as we predict 
that fluency causes changes in affective response, we expect the Incoherent and Early Incoherent 
to differ in terms of positive and negative affect, with the Early Incoherent scenarios behaving in 
the same way as the Coherent scenarios instead. Specifically, the Early Incoherent condition is 
expected to be liked more than the Incoherent condition, and when the items are high risk (negative 
valence), we would also expect the Early Incoherent condition to be disliked more than the 
Incoherent condition, a pattern which is consistent with a multi-source account.   
Method 
Participants. Forty one (35 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology 
undergraduate course (39 psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab 
token scheme. The mean age was 20.00 years (SE ± 0.43 years). In a between subjects design, 
twenty participants (16 female, mean age = 20.13 years, SE ± 0.88 years) completed the experiment 
using a liking scale, and twenty one participants (19 female, mean age = 19.90 years, SE ± 0.40 
years) completed the experiment using a disliking scale.  
Materials. The Coherent and Incoherent conditions remained the same as Experiment 1. For 
Experiment 2, we added a third scenario type: Early Incoherent. These scenarios were constructed 
by reorganising the items from the Incoherent scenarios, but keeping the overall content exactly 
the same. As in Experiment 1, Incoherent scenarios ended on the incoherent item; for Early 
Incoherent scenarios, the incoherent item was presented first, followed by the two coherent items. 
For each of the nine business types, participants were presented with six conditions (four were the 
same as Experiment 1: Coherent-High risk, Coherent-Low risk, Incoherent-High risk, Incoherent-
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Low risk; two were new to Experiment 2: Early Incoherent-High risk, Early Incoherent-Low risk), 
totalling 54 business scenarios in this experiment. Participants were shown each scenario once, 
and in a random order. 
Instead of using a bipolar rating scale, Experiment 2 used two separate unipolar scales. Both 
scales were nine point SAM scales, with the liking version ranging from a neutral expression to a 
happy expression, and the disliking version ranging from a neutral expression to an unhappy 
expression. 
Design. The experiment used a three (Coherent vs Incoherent vs Early Incoherent) by two (High 
risk vs Low risk) by two (Liking scale vs Disliking scale) mixed design, with the type of scale 
manipulated as the between groups variable. Self-reported affect was recorded as the dependent 
variable, whilst response time to complete the affect rating was recorded as a check for fluency.  
Procedure. The procedure followed that of Experiment 1, save for the following adjustments. 
We added a third scenario type (Early Incoherent – detailed above), added a break in the middle 
of the experiment to allow the participants to relax their eyes, and we removed the risk rating scale. 
Results 
Response times. We ran a 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) x 2 (Scale: Liking vs Disliking) mixed ANOVA, with Scale as the between groups 
variable on the time to respond to the rating (liking or disliking) SAM scales. Results showed a 
main effect of Coherence (F(2, 78) = 26.877, p < .001, ηp
2 = .408) and a main effect of Risk (F(1, 39) 
= 15.171, p < .001, ηp
2 = .280). There was no significant main effect regarding Scale (F(1, 39) = 
0.674, p = .417, ηp
2 = .017), nor significant interaction effects. For further information, simple 
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effects revealed that the response time to rate Incoherent scenarios (1,733ms) was longer than 
Coherent scenarios (1,415ms, p < .001) and Early Incoherent scenarios (1,263ms, p < .001).  
Liking ratings. A 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs 
Low) repeated measures ANOVA was run on the liking ratings. Results (Figure 5) revealed main 
effects of Coherence (F(2, 38) = 21.128, p < .001, ηp
2 = .527) and Risk (F(1, 19) = 16.438, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .464), but no significant interaction effect (F(2, 38) = 0.187, p = .830, ηp
2 = .010).  
For further information, Coherent scenarios (M = 6.22) and Early Incoherent scenarios (M = 
6.00) were liked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 4.72; vs Coherent: t(19) = 4.804, p < .001, dz 
= 1.074; vs Early Incoherent: t(19) = 4.024, p = .001, dz = .900) in the High risk condition. There 
was no significant difference in liking ratings between the Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios 
(p = .085, dz = .406). Similarly, Coherent scenarios (M = 7.49) and Early Incoherent scenarios (M 
= 7.31) were liked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.08; vs Coherent: t(19) = 4.882, p < .001, 
dz = 1.092; vs Early Incoherent: t(19) = 4.263, p < .001, dz = .953) in the Low risk condition. There 
was no significant difference in liking ratings between the Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios 
(p = .105, dz = .381). 
Disliking ratings. A 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs 
Low) repeated measures ANOVA was run on the disliking ratings. Results (Figure 5) revealed a 
main effect of Risk (F(1, 20) = 73.741, p < .001, ηp
2 = .787), which was qualified by a significant 
Coherence x Risk interaction effect (F(2, 40) = 5.847, p = .006, ηp
2 = .226). The main effect of 
Coherence was not significant (F(2, 40) = 2.702, p = .079, ηp
2 = .119).  
Unpacking the significant interaction effect, paired samples t-tests revealed that, in the High 
risk condition, Coherent scenarios (M = 6.45) were disliked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 
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5.86, t(20) = 2.527, p = .020, dz = .551). Early Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.51) were also disliked 
more than the Incoherent scenarios (t(20) = 2.631, p = .016, dz = .574). There was no significant 
difference in disliking ratings between the Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios (t(20) = .498, p 
= .624, dz = .109). 
In comparison, the Low risk condition showed no significant difference in rating between 
Coherent (M = 2.57) and Incoherent scenarios (M = 2.69, t(19) = .890, p = .384, dz = .194), between 
Early Incoherent (M = 2.76) and Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = .298, p = .769, dz = .065), or between 
Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = 1.228, p = .234, dz = .268).  
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 expanded on those from the first experiment. As before, 
processing fluency was successfully manipulated by coherence of scenario; with Coherent 
scenarios being responded to faster than Incoherent scenarios. The increased processing fluency 
appeared to influence both liking and disliking ratings, measured separately with unipolar scales.  
The results from the liking ratings showed that Coherent scenarios were liked more than 
Incoherent, regardless of whether the scenarios were high or low risk. In contrast, the disliking 
ratings demonstrated that valence has an effect: when the scenarios were high risk, participants 
disliked the Coherent scenarios more, but when the scenarios were low risk, there was no 
significant difference in disliking ratings.  
Although the findings have consistencies with hedonic marking (including rare evidence of 
hedonic marking using negative stimuli) and fluency amplification (see Table 1 for predictions), 
neither models can account for the full pattern of results individually. For example, hedonic 
marking would not account for an increase in disliking for Coherent scenarios in the high risk 
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condition. Similarly, fluency amplification would not account for an increase in liking for Coherent 
scenarios in the high risk condition. Instead, the results are consistent with the proposed multi-
source model; where in these special circumstances – fluent and negative – we see increased liking 
and increased disliking. These results also shed light on the Coherent-High risk condition of 
Experiment 1, where we found no significant difference in liking ratings between Coherent and 
Incoherent scenarios. Extrapolating the results from Experiment 2, it is suggested that positive and 
negative affect had been evoked, before cancelling each other out when completing the bipolar 
rating scale.  
Experiment 2 also addressed an alternative explanation from Experiment 1: that differences in 
affective response could be due to changing meaning, rather than fluency. We created a new 
scenario type – Early Incoherent – by reordering the information from the Incoherent scenarios. 
With these new scenarios, we were able to alter the processing fluency, without changing the 
content. Tests of response time indicated that the manipulation was successful in altering 
processing fluency, with Early Incoherent scenarios being responded to faster than the Incoherent 
scenarios. Despite containing the same information, results showed that participants liked Early 
Incoherent scenarios more than the Incoherent scenarios. In the High risk condition, participants 
also disliked the Early Incoherent scenarios more than the Incoherent scenarios. The pattern of 
results mirrors that of the Coherent vs Incoherent comparison; providing evidence that fluency 
effects affective responses, even when the meaning is tightly controlled.  
Where the results indicated that the Early Incoherent scenarios were liked more than the 
Incoherent scenarios, one may question whether this is due to expectation generation and 
disconfirmation: in Incoherent scenarios, were participants being led to expect a coherent third 
item based on the previous two items, only to be surprised and frustrated when they encounter an 
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incoherent item? However, examination of the disliking ratings demonstrates that this explanation 
is not appropriate. In the Low risk (positive valence) condition, there was no significant difference 
in disliking between the Incoherent, Early Incoherent, and Coherent scenarios. Furthermore, for 
the High risk (negative valence) condition, the Incoherent scenarios were disliked less than the 
other conditions. These findings demonstrate the importance of measuring positive and negative 
affect separately, alongside the manipulation of stimuli valence. Similarly, if the presence of an 
incoherent item within a scenario was causing participants to become frustrated, to find the 
scenario difficult to comprehend, or to feel annoyed at a breach of experimenter discourse rules, 
then one would expect the Early Incoherent trials – which contained an incoherent item – to also 
be liked less (and disliked more) than the Coherent trials.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 showed that under certain conditions – fluent and negative – it was possible for 
positive and negative affect to be evoked by processing fluency. However, a limitation was the use 
of self-report scales. As shown by Bornstein and D’Agostino (1994), participants may attribute 
fluency onto the most appropriate source available, such as if they are presented with a liking scale. 
In our final experiment, we wanted to ensure that we were recording genuine affect, and not merely 
the attribution of processing fluency. Considering this, we removed the liking self-report scales, 
and instead measured affect using fEMG.  
Following electrode placement recommended by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986), it is possible 
to measure positive affect by recording the muscle activity of zygomaticus major. Similarly, 
recording the activity of corrugator supercilii reveals the level of negative affect (Cacioppo et al., 
1986). Applying this to the predictions in Table 1, hedonic marking would therefore predict that 
increasing fluency would result in an increase in zygomaticus activity, regardless of stimuli 
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valence. Fluency amplification would make the same prediction for positive scenarios, however 
in negative scenarios, an increase in fluency should result in an increase in corrugator supercilii 
activity. However, if the two processes are indeed separate and make individual contributions to 
affect, it is expected that the separate measurement of positive and negative affect will show 
evidence of both hedonic marking and fluency amplification.   
If this is the case, in low risk conditions we would expect fluent scenarios to be met with 
increased zygomaticus activity, which is consistent with both accounts. However, in the high risk 
conditions, we would expect an increase in zygomaticus activity – due to the positive marking of 
processing fluency – as well as an increase in corrugator activity – due to the amplification of the 
condition’s valence.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-one (35 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology 
undergraduate course (34 psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab 
token scheme. The mean age was 19.39 years old (SE ± 0.23 years). Power analysis recommended 
a sample size of 37, considering a medium-large effect size and Power > .80. We recruited past 
this to take into account four participants whose corrugator supercilii data were discarded due to 
artefacts.  
Materials. Once again, business scenarios were used as the stimuli, in the same design as 
Experiment 1, but with the following changes:  
Firstly, we effectively doubled the number of scenarios from 36 to 72 in anticipation for 
discarded trials as a result of artefacts, such as eye blinks. We did this by swapping the positions 
of the first and second item in each scenario. Secondly, following feedback from participants, the 
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business scenarios were potentially too complicated for the targeted participant pool. Therefore, 
the wording was simplified, and more straightforward businesses used (e.g. replacing 
manufacturing and pharmaceutical trials with a zoo and a cinema). An example of the new items 
used in Experiment 3 can be seen in Table 4.  
Lastly, Experiment 3 used fEMG recording to measure the affective responses, instead of the 
self-report SAM scales used in the previous experiments. The same risk rating scale was used as 
in the Experiment 1. fEMG was recorded for the duration of the experiment from bipolar 
electrodes. The two sites recorded were the zygomaticus major muscle (cheek) and the corrugator 
supercilii muscle (brow). Electrode placement followed the guidelines of Fridlund and Cacioppo 
(1986). The experimental procedure was started once the impedance was reduced to less than 
10kΩ.  
Design. The experiment used a two (Coherent vs Incoherent) by two (High risk vs Low risk) 
repeated measures design, with fEMG amplitude as the dependent variable. Self-reported risk was 
recorded, but reading time of the final item was not, as we needed a constant window in which to 
record fEMG.  
Procedure. Once the participant had given consent, their face was prepared for electrode 
placement. The left cheek, left eyebrow, centre of forehead, and right jaw were wiped with alcohol. 
At these sites, the skin was also gently abraded using conductive gel. Bilateral electrodes were 
prepared with conductive gel and then attached at the left cheek and let eyebrow using surgical 
tape – with the electrode placement following Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). A ground electrode 
was attached in the same way at the centre forehead, as well as a reference electrode at the right 
jaw.  
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The remainder of the experimental procedure followed that of Experiment 1, except for the 
following alteration to accommodate fEMG. The final item of information in the triad was no 
longer self-paced. Instead, the final item remained on the screen for 3,000ms, whilst facial muscle 
activity was recorded, before automatically progressing to the next screen. This next screen was 
now the risk rating screen, as per Experiment 1, with the SAM scale for liking ratings no longer 
being used.  
fEMG analysis. For each trial, fEMG activity was captured from the zygomaticus major and 
corrugator supercilii at two key segments. The first was a pre-stimulus baseline, which was a 
period of 0-500ms prior to the onset of the final item of information. At this point, the participant 
was viewing a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. The second segment was the test period, 
1,501-3,000ms post onset of the final item of information. During this period, the final item of 
information was still visible on the screen (see Figure 1 for a timeline displaying fEMG 
segmentation). The test period was selected based on previous findings, with no significant 
differences in zygomaticus or corrugator activity being found between Coherent and Incoherent 
trials in the period 0-1,500ms post stimulus onset (Topolinski et al., 2009). Similarly, fluency 
effects on zygomaticus activity have not been found in later periods (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 
2001). It was also based on the reading times from Experiment 1, showing that participants took 
roughly 3 seconds to read the final item. A window of 1,501-3,000ms from stimulus onset was 
therefore deemed appropriate, as this would capture the immediate affective response to reading 
the scenario, and reduce the risk of the participant undergoing more effortful reasoning.  
These segments were screened for outliers, in particular for artefacts from movement such as 
blinking. Any trials containing such artefacts were manually rejected following visual inspection. 
For the remaining trials, the average, absolute activity was exported. This activity was standardised 
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and any trials with a z-score of ±3.29 were discarded. We also compared the number of rejected 
trials across conditions to ensure that no condition was over or under represented.  
For the remaining trials, the rectified, average absolute activity from the test segment was 
compared to the pre-stimulus baseline from the same trial. This gave a percentage change from 
baseline for each trial, for both the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscles.  
Results 
The overall 2 (Muscle: Zygomaticus vs Corrugator) x 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 
2 (Risk: High vs Low) returned a significant Muscle x Coherence x Risk interaction (F(1, 36) = 
5.288, p = .027, ηp
2 = .13), which allowed for the separate analysis of each muscle. 
Zygomaticus. A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated 
measures ANOVA was run on the Zygomaticus data for the test interval (1501-3000ms post 
stimulus onset) against the pre-stimulus baseline. Results revealed a main effect of Coherence 
(F(1,40) = 6.927, p = .012, ηp
2 = .15), with Coherent triads (M = .050) showing a greater increase in 
activity from baseline than Incoherent triads (M = .022). Neither the main effect of Risk (F(1,40) = 
0.269, p = .607, ηp
2 < .01), nor the interaction effect (F(1,40)  = 0.015, p = .905, ηp
2 < .01) were 
significant. Percentage changes from baseline for all four conditions are shown in Figure 6. 
Corrugator. A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated 
measures ANOVA was run on the Corrugator data for the test interval (1501-3000ms post stimulus 
onset) against the pre-stimulus baseline, revealing a significant interaction effect between 
Coherence and Risk (F(1,36) = 5.590, p = .024, ηp
2 = .13). Neither of the main effects were 
significant (Coherence: F(1,36) = 1.761, p = .193, ηp
2 = .05; Risk: F(1,37) = 1.583, p = .216, ηp
2 = 
.04). Percentage changes from baseline for all four conditions are shown in Figure 7.  
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Unpacking the interaction effect, paired samples t-tests revealed that for the High risk condition, 
Corrugator activity rose from baseline significantly more for Coherent scenarios (M = .065) 
compared to Incoherent scenarios (M = .019, t(36) = 2.403, p = .022, dz = .395). For the Low risk 
condition, there was no significant difference between Coherent (M = .045) and Incoherent 
scenarios (M = .061, t(36) = 1.095, p = .281, dz = .180).  
Risk ratings. A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs 
Low) ANOVA was run on the participants’ risk ratings, revealing a main effect of Risk (F(1,40) = 
343.304, p < .001, ηp
2 = .90), with the high risk conditions (M = 6.53) receiving higher risk ratings 
than the low risk conditions (M = 3.12), and a significant interaction effect between Coherence 
and Risk (F(1,40) = 6.517, p = .015, ηp
2 = .14). The main effect of Coherence approached 
significance (F(1,40) = 3.983, p = .053, ηp
2 = .09).  
Paired samples t-tests were used to investigate the interaction effect. Results revealed that for 
the Low risk condition, Coherent scenarios (M = 3.06) were judged to be significantly less risky 
than Incoherent scenarios (M = 3.19, t(40) = 3.428, p = .001, dz = .535). For the High risk condition, 
no significant differences were found between Coherent (M = 6.53) and Incoherent scenarios (M 
= 6.53, t(40) = .179, p = .859, dz = .028). 
Rejected trials. The number of rejected trials due to artefacts, such as eye blinks, were 
compared across condition. A 2 (Muscle: Zygomaticus vs Corrugator) x 2 (Coherence: Coherent 
vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) returned only a significant effect of Muscle (F(1, 36) = 
104.079, p < .001, ηp
2 = .743), indicating that artefacts were more likely to occur from corrugator 
measurement than zygomaticus.  
Discussion 
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The use of fEMG in this experiment allowed for the separate measurement of positive and 
negative affective responses by separately measuring the zygomaticus major and corrugator 
supercilii muscles. The results from the zygomaticus major muscle (indicating positive affect) 
demonstrated a greater increase in activity from baseline for Coherent scenarios, compared to 
Incoherent scenarios. This main effect occurred across high and low risk scenarios, supporting the 
hedonic marking of fluency.  
In contrast, the results from the corrugator supercilii muscle (indicating negative affect) showed 
an interaction effect. As illustrated in Figure 7, the affective response to coherence was dependent 
on the valence of the scenario. In High risk (negative valence) scenarios, muscle activity increased 
more for Coherent scenarios than Incoherent scenarios. In Low risk (positive valence) scenarios, 
muscle activity increased more for Incoherent scenarios than Coherent scenarios. This pattern is 
consistent with a fluency amplification account.  
These findings therefore suggest that increasing the processing fluency in negative conditions 
results in both a positive affective response (indicated by increase zygomaticus activity from 
baseline), and a negative affective response (indicated by increase corrugator activity from 
baseline). Neither the hedonic marking, nor the fluency amplification hypotheses account for this 
pattern individually. Instead, the pattern supports a mutli-source account, whereby the separate 
mechanisms contribute to the affective response.  
It could be questioned whether the corrugator activity was reflecting an increase in effort, the 
emotion of surprise, or (as addressed in the discussion for Experiment 2) frustration in 
comprehension, rather than negative affect. However, if this was the case, we would expect greater 
activity for Incoherent conditions compared to Coherent conditions, regardless of valence, such as 
demonstrated by Topolinski & Strack (2015). Instead, results showed an interaction effect and no 
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main effect of coherence. Confidence can therefore be gained that corrugator activity was indeed 
representing negative affect. 
General Discussion 
This paper tested the contribution of two key processes – hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification – to overall affective responses to fluency. A novel multi-source perspective was 
taken, treating hedonic marking and fluency amplification as two separate, co-existing 
mechanisms, rather than as competing explanations (e.g. Cheetham et al., 2014; Chetverikov & 
Kristjánsson, 2016; Gerger et al., 2016, Muth et al., 2015). As such, it was predicted that affective 
responses to fluency would be best described using a multi-source account. 
Over three experiments, we found that Coherent (fluent) scenarios were liked more than 
Incoherent scenarios, as consistent with both the hedonic marking hypothesis and the fluency 
amplification model. However, the critical condition was for negative scenarios, as the two 
accounts make incompatible predictions (see Table 1). For these negative scenarios, we found 
patterns of affective responses to increased processing fluency that could not be explained by 
hedonic marking or fluency amplification in isolation. When liking was measured using bipolar 
self-report scales (Experiment 1), there was no difference in liking between the Coherent and 
Incoherent negative scenarios. This could be explained by the multi-source account, as the co-
occurring positive and negative affect would have negated each other. This was investigated 
further in Experiment 2 by separate unipolar scales to look at positive and negative affect 
separately. In the critical negative condition, we found evidence for both increased liking and 
increased disliking when the scenarios were fluent. This was supported by fEMG evidence 
(Experiment 3), whereby increasing the coherence of negative scenarios resulted in an increase in 
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both zygomaticus major activity (indicating positive affect) and corrugator supercilli activity 
(indicating negative affect).    
The manipulation of stimulus valence, alongside separate measurement of positive and negative 
affect in the current study allowed for two other unique findings. Firstly, by providing support for 
a hedonic marking process, even in more negative conditions. Previously evidence for hedonic 
marking was limited to more positive or neutral stimuli (e.g. Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). 
Secondly, the current study has found evidence for fluency amplification processes using fEMG, 
whereas previous evidence has been based on bipolar self-report (e.g. Albrecht & Carbon, 2014).  
The current study also adapted the traditional word triad task procedure (e.g. Topolinski et al., 
2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009b), incorporating business scenarios as task items. Using these 
scenarios, we were able to successfully manipulate the processing fluency by varying the 
consistency to typical schemas. A secondary benefit of this study is therefore the demonstration 
that testing fluency effects is achievable using more ecologically valid designs.   
A competing explanation for the results gathered in this paper could be proposed regarding 
expectation generation and disconfirmation (e.g. Oliver, 1980; Oliver & Swan, 1989). This would 
suggest that participants were being led to expect a coherent third item, based on the first two items 
in a scenario. Therefore, in Incoherent scenarios, the participants may feel frustrated when 
encountering the incoherent item. We argue against this explanation, firstly as expectation 
disconfirmation would typically relate to valanced incongruence. This would be appropriate if, for 
example, participants were presented with Low risk (positive) items, followed by a High risk 
(negative) item. This would cause negative disconfirmation, where participants have expectations 
built up, only to be let down by the final item. This has been shown to cause negative evaluations 
for household products (Darke, Ashworth, & Main, 2010), automobiles (Oliver & Swan, 1989), 
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and holidays (Zehrer, Crotts, & Magnini, 2011). In contrast, the current set of experiments keep 
the valence of the item consistent within each scenario. In other words, if the first item is Low risk 
(positive), then so will the second and third items. Therefore, the incoherent items do not cause 
either positive or negative disconfirmation, as their valence never differs from those items 
preceding it in any given scenario.  
Secondly, if frustration, annoyance, or difficulty in comprehension were responsible for the 
lower liking ratings for Incoherent scenarios, then one would also expect the Incoherent scenarios 
to result in higher disliking ratings. In contrast, examination of the High risk scenarios 
demonstrates higher disliking ratings for Coherent scenarios compared to Incoherent scenarios in 
Experiment 2. Furthermore, Experiment 3 found a greater increase in corrugator activity 
(indicating negative affect) for Coherent-High risk scenarios than for Incoherent-High risk 
scenarios.  
That is not to say that expectation does not play some part in our findings. The current 
experiments used business scenarios that were either Coherent or Incoherent with typical schemas 
that participants hold; and those scenarios that are Coherent with these schemas are by nature more 
in line with expectations. So, whilst expectation disconfirmation does not explain the results, it is 
clear that there are commonalities. It is therefore suggested that expectation disconfirmation 
studies could be revisited through a multi-source lens, with conceptual fluency examined as the 
link between expectation and evaluation. 
A limitation of the current research could be that the use of business scenarios and risk 
manipulations would not have been particularly affective. This is apparent in comparison to 
Albrecht and Carbon (2014), where the “very negative” and “very positive” images would have 
evoked a stronger emotional response. However, making the business scenarios more extreme in 
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terms of valence may have reduced the realism. Therefore the loss of affective range is considered 
acceptable in the light of aiming for greater ecological validity. We were also limited to the 
complexity of scenarios used, due to the student sample. It is suggested that future studies expand 
on the business scenario task by adding an increased number of scenarios, with increasing levels 
of complexity, to test participants with higher levels of expertise.  
A second limitation is that the current research, in line with the vast majority of research on 
affective responses to fluency, used valence as the affect measure. Whilst the scope of this research 
was to investigate patterns of affective response to fluency, we note that there is more to affect 
than valence. Moving forward, the components of this affective response should be investigated, 
as has been done by a small minority of studies using PANAS (Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008) 
or arousal (Forster, Leder, & Ansorge, 2016), another dimension to affect.  
Having provided preliminary evidence for hedonic marking and fluency amplification co-
existing, it would beneficial to further understand their relationship, and why fluency potentially 
evokes both positive and negative affect. A possibility is that hedonic marking detects fluency, 
identifying situations where it is deemed safe to use non-analytic processing mechanisms such as 
fluency amplification. This would represent a system for jumping to conclusions, quickly 
emphasising positives and negatives, provided it is safe to do so. This would fit conceptually with 
the idea that fluency does not just influence judgement, but also our cognitive operations 
(Oppenheimer, 2008); especially if affect was found to be the link in this process. For example, 
Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) Pleasure-Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking suggests that fluency-
based positive affective responses (such as from hedonic marking) act as a cue deterring controlled 
processing, in favour of automatic processing. If automatic processing is encouraged, perhaps 
fluency amplification acts as the mechanism to quickly decide whether the aesthetic stimulus is 
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liked or disliked. Along this line of enquiry, it would be therefore of interest in further studies to 
determine if there is a timing element to these processes, for example does hedonic marking trigger 
fluency amplification?  
A further explanation would be that fluency amplification can act as a defence mechanism for 
hedonic marking. For example, a negative scenario may evoke positive affect due to hedonic 
marking, thus acting as a cue for safety. Fluency amplification would work in the opposite 
direction in this case, potentially cancelling out positive affect, and motivating the individual to 
avoid the situation. Further studies exploring this avenue could therefore incorporate 
approach/avoidance paradigm (e.g. Carr, Rotteveel, & Winkielman, 2016) alongside negative 
stimuli to test the hypothesis. 
As well as understanding more about the affective responses, this research has implications for 
other judgements arising from fluency manipulations. As has been shown, affective responses to 
fluency can used as a cue for other judgements (Topolinski, 2011), rather than fluency itself. 
Topolinski and Strack (2009b) demonstrated this with a misattribution paradigm, whereby 
participants were able to intuitively discriminate coherent from incoherent word triads, provided 
they did not misattribute the source of affect to a different source. This assumes the cue is the 
positive affective response resulting from hedonic marking. However, it could be investigated as 
to whether the affective response arising from fluency amplification holds any information as a 
cue for judgement. For example, does misattribution work if the stimuli are negative, and therefore 
also generating negative affect? Is it possible to reattribute negative affect as well as positive 
affect?  
 




The experiments in this paper present a unique pattern of results, not entirely explained by either 
the hedonic marking hypothesis or by fluency amplification, in isolation. Instead, the pattern of 
affective responses to increased processing fluency may be best explained by a multi-source 
account, which predicts the co-existence of these two processes as discrete mechanisms. Firstly, 
increasing the coherence of stimuli results in a positive affective response, regardless of the 
stimuli’s valence, due to the positive marking of processing fluency. Secondly, increasing 
coherence results in an affective response that is congruent with the condition’s valence. Therefore, 
preliminary evidence has been gathered suggesting that hedonic marking and fluency amplification 
are not alternative accounts for the direct response to fluency, but are separate mechanisms, and 
both make a contribution to overall affective responses.  
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Table 1: Table of predictions for the 3 accounts – hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and 
the multi-source account – for positive and negative stimuli.  
Hypothesis 
Increased processing fluency (coherent vs incoherent) for… 
Positively Valenced Stimuli  
(Low Risk) 




Increases positive affect Increases positive affect 
Fluency 
Amplification 
Increases positive affect Increases negative affect 
Multi-source 
account 
Increases positive affect 
Increases positive affect 
& 
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Table 2: Example items of information used in the pilot study, for the Travel business scenarios. 
The participants were given the following background information: 
“A well known ‘bricks-and-mortar’ travel agent situated in town offering holiday 
bookings to a wide range of destinations, in the UK and overseas. The company has 
expanded its online offering, and has expertise in adventure, action, and sports holidays.” 
Followed by one of the triads of information as per the grids below: 
 High Risk Low Risk 
Item 1 
An area which consumers look to cut 
back on during difficult economic times 
Recovery of global tourism industry 
Item 2 
Big competitor companies hold a large 
market share 
The number of domestic holidays has 
steadily increased over the last few 
years 
Item 3 
Instability overseas can threaten 
consumer confidence 
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Table 3: Example items of information used in Experiment 1, for the Travel business scenarios. 
The participants were given the following background information: 
“A well known ‘bricks-and-mortar’ travel agent situated in town offering holiday 
bookings to a wide range of destinations, in the UK and overseas. The company has 
expanded its online offering, and has expertise in adventure, action, and sports holidays.” 











An area which 
consumers look to cut 
back on during 
difficult economic 
times 
Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
An area which 
consumers look to cut 
back on during 
difficult economic 
times 




companies hold a large 
market share 
The number of 
domestic holidays has 
steadily increased over 
the last few years 
Big competitor 
companies hold a large 
market share 
The number of 
domestic holidays has 
steadily increased over 
the last few years 
Item 3 
Instability overseas 
can threaten consumer 
confidence 
The company is selling 
a desirable product 
Increase in popularity 
of free sports such as 




activities that lead to a 
healthy, active lifestyle 
 
 Schema  incoherent 
 Schema coherent 
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Table 4: Example items of information used in Experiment 3 for the Leisure Centre business. 
The design was structurally the same as in Experiment 1, but the items themselves were re-
written to be more salient to the participants. Participants were given the following background 
information: 
“A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 
25m swimming pool, fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for classes and 
courses.” 












Risk of injury to 
customers 
Offers a good variety 
of services 
Risk of injury to 
customers 
Offers a good variety 
of services 
Item 2 
Staff must be well 
trained 
Appeals to up-market 
customers 
Staff must be well 
trained 






Promotes a healthy, 
positive image 
Can be weather 
dependent 
Popular day out for 
families 
 
 Schema  incoherent 
 Schema coherent 
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Figure 1: Timeline detailing the timings for stimuli presentation in Experiments 1-3, alongside 
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Figure 2: Pre-study - Graph showing liking ratings from the five-point SAM scale, and self-
reported risk, for high risk and low risk business scenarios.  
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Figure 3: Experiment 1 – Mean reading times (ms) for the final item in the triad. Comparing 
items that are presented as part of a schema coherent triad of information, to items presented 
incoherent to the schema, and for both high risk and low risk conditions. 
* p = .016, ** p = .001.  
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Figure 4: Experiment 1 – Mean liking ratings for the business scenarios. Comparing coherent 
and incoherent triads, for both high risk and low risk conditions. 
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Figure 5: Experiment 2 – Mean liking and disliking ratings for the business scenarios. 














Figure 6: Experiment 3 – Zygomaticus activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus 
onset) shown as a percentage change from pre stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and 
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Figure 7: Experiment 3 – Corrugator activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus 
onset) shown as a percentage change from pre stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and 
incoherent triads, for both high risk and low risk conditions. 
 
 
 
 
